Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity: A Sane Approach by Weiner, Barbara A.
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Volume 56 Issue 4 Article 3 
December 1980 
Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity: A Sane Approach 
Barbara A. Weiner 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Barbara A. Weiner, Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity: A Sane Approach, 56 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1057 (1980). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol56/iss4/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
NOT GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY:
A SANE APPROACH
BARBARA A. WEINER*
For more than two decades, the legal literature has been filled with
articles on the insanity defense.' Discussion has centered around the
standard used to excuse someone from criminal responsibility,
2
whether the defense should be abolished,3 and whether the defense is
being overused.4  In recent years, a number of states have discussed
changing their laws relating to the insanity defense. This article will
review the historical background of the defense and will explore the
present state of the defense in the United States. Problems with the
procedures after being found not guilty by reason of insanity5 will be
examined and model legislation will be presented to correct those
problems. Finally, the article includes an analysis of why due process
and equal protection are not violated by treating the NGRI individual
differently than other civilly committed persons.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE
Today in the United States, the insanity defense is recognized in
every jurisdiction as an affirmative criminal defense.6 This defense can
be raised whenever intent is an element of the crime. By pleading the
insanity defense, the defendant is admitting that he has committed the
act that he is accused of, but is stating that because of his "insanity" he
* Administrator and Counsel to the Section on Psychiatry and Law, Department of Psychi-
atry, Rush-Presbyterian-St. Lukes Medical Center; operates the Isaac Ray Center, an outpatient
program for persons found not guilty by reason of insanity. J.D., De Paul College; B.A., Univer-
sity of Maryland.
I. See, e.g., Monahan, Abolish the Insanity Tesi?-Not Yet, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 719 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Monahan]; Morris, Psychiatry andthe Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. REV.
514 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Morris]; Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense" - Why
Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Goldstein & Katz]; H. FINGARETTE & A.
HASSE, MENTAL DISABILITIES AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979); H. FINGARETTE, THE
MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY (1972).
2. See, e.g., A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM (1974); A.
GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1967) [hereinafter cited as GOLDSTEIN].
3. See, e.g., Monahan supra note 1; Goldstein & Katz supra note 1; Brady, Abolish the In-
sanity Defense - No!, 8 Hous. L. REV. 629 (1971).
4. See, e.g., Morris supra note I.
5. Hereinafter sometimes referred to as NGRI.
6. See Appendix A.
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could not form the requisite mental state, the intent which is a crucial
element of the crime.
The recognition that crimes are based on the existence of a mens
rea/mental state, as well as an actus rea/physical act, goes back more
than three thousand years. 7 The Hebrews made a distinction between
intentional and unintentional crimes, and neither children nor insane
persons were held criminally responsible for their acts, nor did they
have to compensate their victims.8 The Greek philosophers, beginning
with Plato, recognized that individuals had a free will which made it
possible for them to be responsible for the good and evil in their lives.9
Aristotle believed that an individual was morally responsible if, with
knowledge of the circumstances and freedom from external compul-
sion, he deliberately chose to commit a specific act.' 0
In the sixth century, the Code of Justinian recognized the status of
children and insane persons as not being responsible for their acts. I I At
that time, there also appeared the beginnings of a "heat of passion" test
with the recognition that "punishment is mitigated" for one who com-
mits homicide in a brawl. 12 By the time of Elizabeth I of England, the
law had evolved to the point where insane persons and children were
exempted from punishment for their acts because they could not com-
prehend the morality of what they had done.13
Thus, the concept evolved that, like children, insane persons had
no free will and therefore could not avoid doing the criminal acts they
did. The morality of society dictated that these insane persons not be
punished because they could not control their behavior. However, al-
though these individuals were not punished in the traditional sense by
losing an arm for stealing or a life for killing, they were not set free but
were restrained in some manner. This usually meant that they spent
the rest of their lives institutionalized.
M'Naghfen
These early laws relating to lack of criminal responsibility formed
7. See Gerber, Is the Insanity Test Insane, 20 AM. J. JuRIus. 111 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Gerber]. This article provides a good review of the insanity defense.
8. The Talmud provides: "It is an ill thing to knock against a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a
minor: He that wounds them is culpable, but if they wound others they are not culpable .... For
with them only the act is of consequence while the intention is of no consequence." Quen, Anglo-
American Criminal Insanity-An Historical Perspective, 10 J. HIST. BEHAV. Sci. 313 (1974).
9. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 350 (Conford trans. 1945).
10. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 58 (Ross trans. 1975).
1I. DIGEST 48. 8. 2.
12. Id.
13. See Gerber, supra note 7, at 114.
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the foundations of our present insanity defenses which arose from the
case of Daniel M'Naghten. 14 In 1843, Daniel M'Naghten, a Glasgow
wood turner, suffered from the delusion that the British Prime Minister,
Sir Robert Peel, the Pope, and the Jesuits were all conspiring against
him. In order to protect himself, M'Naghten decided to kill Peel.
Upon arrival at the Prime Minister's home, M'Naghten shot Edward
Drummond, Peel's secretary, believing him to be the Prime Minister.
M'Naghten's trial was the first to recognize the developing medical
science of psychiatry. Nine medical witnesses testified that M'Naghten
was totally insane. Dr. Isaac Ray's book on forensic psychiatry was
widely quoted to the court. 15 The jury found M'Naghten insane' 6 and
he spent the remainder of his life in Broadmoor, a mental institution.
The case created such a furor that Parliament debated whether
M'Naghten's acquittal would make it easier for criminals to be excused
for their behavior.17 The Parliament asked the common law judges to
respond to five questions.' 8 Their answers resulted in the adoption of
the M'Naghten rule in Great Britain. The answer of Lord Chief Justice
Tindal became the official statement of the rule:
[Tihe jurors ought to be told in all cases that every man is to be
presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to
be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to their
satisfaction; and that to establish a defence on the ground of insanity,
it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the
act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason,
from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he
was doing what was wrong. 19
14. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
15. 1. RAY, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY (1838).
16. 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 720 (1843).
17. Id. at 720-24.
18. The five questions were as follows: What is the law respecting alleged crimes committed
by persons afflicted with insane delusion with respect to one or more particular subjects or per-
sons; as for instance, at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, the accused knew he was
acting contrary to law, but did the act complained of with a view, under the influence of insane
delusion, of redressing or revenging some supposed grievance or injury, or of producing some
supposed public benefit? 2. What are the proper questions to be submitted to the jury when a
person, alleged to be inflicted with an insane delusion respecting one or more particular subjects
or persons, is charged with the commission of a crime, and insanity is set up as a defense? 3. In
what terms ought the question to be left to the jury as to the prisoner's state of mind at the time
when the act was committed? 4. If the person under an insane delusion as to existing facts com-
mits an offense in consequence thereof, is he thereby excused? 5. Can a medical man, conversant
with the disease of insanity, who never saw the prisoner previously to the trial, but who was
present during the whole trial and the examination of all witnesses, be asked his opinion as to the
state of the prisoner's mind at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, or his opinion as to
whether the prisoner was conscious at the time of doing the act that he was acting contrary to law,
and whether he was labouring under any and what delusion at that time? Id. at 720.
19. Id. at 722.
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Frequently, a criminal law professor, to demonstrate lack of mens
rea sufficient to meet the MNaghten test, will give the example of the
man who thinks he is squeezing an orange, when he is actually stran-
gling his wife. Obviously in this case the man does not know what he is
doing, is mentally ill, and cannot know that "squeezing an orange" is
wrong. The M'Waghten rule, also known as the right or wrong test,
became part of the law of the United States. This rule has been widely
accepted with little modification in many states for the past 137 years,
and is used by twenty states. 20 Under M'Naghten, the accused is not
responsible for his actions if at the time of the act he had a mental
disease which prevented him from knowing the nature and quality of
the act, or that it was wrong.
2'
Until 1954, the M'Naghten rule was the standard test used in the
United States to determine whether someone was criminally responsi-
ble. As the middle of the twentieth century approached, however, psy-
chiatry became more widely accepted as a medical science possessing
the ability to add knowledge to the determination of whether someone
should be held criminally responsible. Criticism of M'Naghten grew
because the rule did not consider modem advances in psychiatry, and




In 1954, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia reversed the conviction of Monte Durham for housebreaking
and petit larceny. 23 Writing for the majority, Judge David Bazelon
held that Durham had presented enough evidence to raise the issue of
his insanity under the standard then used in the District of Columbia.24
The court used the occasion to reject the M'Naghten rule as too narrow
and espoused a broader test which became known as the Durham rule
or the New Hampshire rule.25 The rule provided that: "[A]n accused is
20. See Appendix A which lists the states that have adopted M'Naghten.
21. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-502 (Supp. 1980) provides:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct the person
was suffering from such a mental disease or defect as not to know the nature and quality
of the act or, if such person did know, that such person did not know that what he was
doing was wrong.
22. See, e.g., F. ALEXANDER, THE CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE, AND THE PUBLIC: A PSYCHOLOG-
ICAL ANALYSIS 70 (1931); B. CARDERO, WHAT MEDICINE CAN DO FOR THE LAW 28 (1930); K.
MENNINGER, THE HUMAN MIND 450 (3d ed. 1945).
23. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
24. Id. at 866. The District of Columbia used M'Naghfen with an irresistible impulse test.
See id. at 869.
25. New Hampshire's test was described in New Hampshire v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869).
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not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of a
mental disease or mental defect."
26
The Durham rule created much controversy, and resulted in many
discussions in the legal literature about its potential impact.27 The rule
was adopted only by Maine, 28 New Hampshire, 29 and the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. 30 The purpose of the rule
was to permit psychiatric testimony on a broad range of issues, with the
definition of mental disease or defect purposely left vague. The imple-
mentation of the Durham rule in the District of Columbia resulted in a
dramatic increase in the number of persons who were excused from
criminal responsibility because of an insanity defense. 3' In the four
years before the Durham rule was implemented, there were thirty-four
people acquitted based on insanity.32 In the four years after the rule,
there were 150 acquittals.33 By 1972, Judge Bazelon repudiated Dur-
ham in a case which accepted the American Law Institute standard 34 as
the appropriate one for the District of Columbia.
35
The major impact of Durham was to spur discussion of what type
of test would be appropriate to avoid the problems of M'Naghten,
which was too narrow, and Durham, which was too broad.36 Durham
was repudiated in United States v. Brawner37 because the D.C. Circuit
felt that the psychiatric experts had been usurping the jury function by
testifying about conclusions which should be drawn from the facts.38
New Hampshire adopted this test in 1869, yet was given very little credit for being innovative. It
was not until Judge Bazelon wrote the Durham decision that discussion began on the innovative-
ness of concepts which New Hampshire had accepted for eighty-five years.
26. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
27. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN supra note 2; Wechsler, The Criteria of Criminal Responsibility, 22
U. CHI. L. REV. 367 (1955); Note, Century oProgress: The Durham Case, INT'L J. FOR. Sci. 41
(1956); Note, The Durham Rule, 40 IOWA L. REV. 652 (1955); Note, Criminal Law.- A Significant
Development in the Law Relating to Insanity as a Defense to Crime, 1955 Wis. L. REV. 506.
28. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 102 (repealed 1976); see id. tit. 17-A, § 58 (1979) (new statute
applies Brawner test).
29. New Hampshire did not codified its law, but stated it in New Hampshire v. Pike, 49 N.H.
399 (1869).
30. The District of Columbia's rule was stated in Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 869
(D.C. Cir. 1954).
31. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA REPORT 535 (1966).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962). See text accompanying note 45 infra.
35. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
36. See, e.g., Hall, Mental Disease and Criminal Responsibility - M'Naghten Versus Durham
and the American Law Institute's Tentative Draft, 33 IND. L.J. 212 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
M'Naghten Versus Durham).
37. 471 F.2d 969, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
38. Id. at 1006.
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Irresistible Impulse
When Durham was adopted by the District of Columbia, the ma-
jority of states were still using M'Naghten.39 Some states added to
M'Naghten the concept of an irresistible impulse.40 Although there
does not appear to be a uniform standard for irresistible impulse, the
concept is that the defendant was unable to control himself. The irre-
sistible impulse test was stated by the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in Smith v. United States:
41
The modern doctrine is that the degree of insanity which will
relieve the accused of the consequences of a criminal act must be
such as to create in his mind an uncontrollable impulse to commit
the offense charged. This impulse must be such as to override the
reason and judgment and obliterate the sense of right and wrong to
the extent that the accused is deprived of the power to choose be-
tween right and wrong. The mere ability to distinguish right from
wrong is no longer the correct test either in civil or criminal cases,
where the defense of insanity is interposed. The accepted rule in this
day and age, with the great advancement in medical science as an
enlightening influence on this subject, is that the accused must be
capable, not only of distinguishing between right and wrong, but that
he was not impelled to do the act by an irresistible impulse, which
means before it will justify a verdict of acquittal that his reasoning
powers were so far dethroned by his diseased mental condition as to
deprive him of the will power to resist the insane impulse to perpe-
trate the deed, though knowing it to be wrong.
42
A number of states still use M'Naghten plus some form of an irresisti-
ble impulse test.
The ALl Test
Beginning in the early 1960's, the American Law Institute43 began
to develop a test to end the strictness of M'Naghten and avoid the
broadness of Durham. The ALI felt that Durham made it possible for a
defendant to use any mental disease as an excuse for avoiding criminal
responsibility. 44 The ALl test stated that:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substan-
tial capacity either to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
39. GOLDSTEIN supra note 2.
40. See Appendix A.
41. 36 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
42. Id. at 549.
43. Hereinafter referred to as ALl.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972); M'Naghten Versus
Durham supra note 36.
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As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do
not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or
otherwise anti-social conduct.
45
The ALl test is now used by twenty-eight states.46
The ALI test is not without its critics. Some commentators feel
that too many people are excused from responsibility under this test.
47
This has resulted in calls for the abolition of the insanity defense,48 and
for psychiatrists to get out of the courtroom.49 Predictably, the contro-
versy about the insanity defense arises each time it is successfully used
in a bizarre murder case.
Diminished Capacity
Although M'Naghten was widely accepted, many states felt that in
certain circumstances the test was too harsh. In 1949, the concept of
diminished responsibility arose in California.5 0 The California
Supreme Court reasoned that when a specific mental state is required it
cannot be presumed but must be proven.5 1 This concept can be used to
reduce the gravity of a charge in a criminal case.5 2 For example, in a
first degree murder case, where there was testimony that the defendant
could not form the specific intent necessary, or could form the specific
intent to some degree, but because of a mental illness he was thinking
deficiently, this evidence might be sufficient to reduce the charge to sec-
ond degree murder or manslaughter. 53 Some form of this concept has
been used by approximately fifteen states. 54 Under this approach, di-
minished capacity does not serve to excuse criminal responsibility but
to mitigate the punishment by reducing the offense with which the de-
fendant is charged, thereby reducing the possible prison sentence.
Before closing this discussion of the background of the insanity
defense, some additional items must be mentioned to give the reader a
45. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1962).
46. See Appendix A.
47. See note 3 supra.
.48. See, e.g., Goldstein & Katz, supra note 1, which was the first of many articles in both the
legal and psychiatric literature to discuss abolition.
49. K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT (1968); T. SzAsz, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSY-
CHIATRY (196"3); Halpern, The Insanity Defense A JuridicalAnachronism, 7:8 PSYCH. ANNALS 41
(1977).
50. California v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949).
51. Id. at 350, 202 P.2d at 65.
52. Id. at 347, 202 P.2d at 63.
53. H. FINGARETTE & A. HASSE, MENTAL DISABILITIES AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
117-33 (1979). This book provides an excellent discussion of the concept of diminished responsi-
bility.
54. Id. at 117 n.L
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complete understanding of the present situation in the United States.
Today, throughout the United States, most of the states use either the
M'Naghten rule,55 the ALl rule,56 or some modification of M'Naghten
such as M'Naghten plus an irresistible impulse test.57 In most states,
the insanity defense is only raised when the defendant is charged with
murder or attempted murder. It is seldom raised in cases of armed
robbery, burglary, or rape. Although most felonies have an intent ele-
ment, it is usually in the murder situation that it seems most plausible
to raise an insanity defense. This defense is most likely to be raised in
the case of killing a family member, or a murder which occurred in a
bizarre way, such as dismembering the victim.
By pleading insanity, the defendant is admitting that he has com-
mitted the act which constitutes the crime, but he is stating that because
of his mental state he could not form the mental intent necessary for
there to be any legal culpability. A good defense attorney will not con-
sider an insanity defense if he believes that the state does not have suffi-
cient evidence to convict his client. This is because an insanity defense
will usually result in some type of institutionalization, whereas an out-
right acquittal makes it possible for the defendant to be freed immedi-
ately.
WHAT HAPPENS TO THE PERSON WHO SUCCESSFULLY PLEADS NOT
GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY?
Past Practices
Like Daniel M'Naghten, defendants who successfully pleaded the
insanity defense knew that they would spend their lives not in a prison,
but in a mental hospital or a hospital for the criminally insane. Be-
cause these individuals would be locked away from the public, prosecu-
tors were often not as vigorous as they could have been in fighting an
insanity defense. The public felt protected when, after daily headlines
from these often bizarre murder cases, the defendant would be found
not guilty by reason of insanity and sent to the state hospital for the
criminally insane. There the individual would usually remain until he
died. The public could feel that society was just because it did not
punish this "sick" killer, but afforded him treatment.
Until the mid-1950's, an individual who was mentally ill would be
sent to a state mental hospital, usually far removed from a population




center, and would remain there for many years, if not the rest of his
life.58 With the advent of psychotropic medication in the 1950's, how-
ever, the entire concept of how to treat the mentally ill changed radi-
cally. Drugs made it possible for patients with chronic illnesses to
control their symptoms. 59 Manic depressive illness could be controlled
by the use of lithium carbonate; 60 hallucinations and paranoid behav-
ior which afflicted the schizophrenic also could be alleviated with
drugs.61
The psychotropic drugs forced the public to readjust its thinking
about mental patients. These drugs made it possible for the individual
to enter the hospital, become stabilized, and then return to his commu-
nity. This in turn led to the emptying of state institutions, greatly re-
ducing the average length of stay in the hospital. For example, in
Illinois in 1955, there were approximately 48,000 beds in the Illinois
Department of Mental Health for mental patients. 62 These patients
would spend an average of ten years and eight months in the hospital.
63
Today, there are about 10,000 inpatient beds, half of which are for the
severely or profoundly retarded.64 The average length of stay for a
mentally ill person in a state hospital is now twenty-two days.65
Added to the success of psychotropic drugs, which started the
move toward deinstitutionalization, came the class action suits of the
late 1960's and early 1970's challenging the procedures whereby an in-
dividual was committed. 66 In addition, the courts recognized the fact
that the patient should be treated in the least restrictive setting neces-
58. E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATIONS OF MENTAL PATIENTS AND
OTHER INMATES (1961) is the classic book on the plight of the mental patient in large state institu-
tions. See also Bassuk & Gerson, Deinstitutionalization and Mental Health Services, 238 ScI. AM.
No. 2 at 46-53 (1978); Etzioni, No Place to Go, THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY, Dec. 1976, at 42;
Raphling & Lion, Patients with Repeated.4dmissions to a Psychiatric Emergency Service, 6 COMM.
MENTAL HEALTH J. 313-18 (1970); Slovenko & Luby, From Moral Treatment to Railroading Out of
the Mental Hospital, 2 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCH. LAW 223-36 (1974).
59. D. GOODWIN & S. GUZE, PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS (2d ed. 1979); Anderson & Kuehnle,
Strategies/or the Treatment of Acute Psychosis, 229 JAMA 1884 (1974).
60. The Lithium Ion Impact on Treatment and Research, 36 ARCH. GEN. PSYCH. No. 8 at 829
(F. Goodwin ed. 1979).
61. L. GRINSPOON, SCHIZOPHRENIA: PHARMACOTHERAPY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY (1972).
62. Illinois Department of Mental Health, Research and Statistical Branch (on file with au-
thor).
63. Id.
64. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH AND DEVELOP-
MENTAL DISABILITIES (1979).
65. Id.
66. Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 119 (1977);
Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Bell v. Wayne County Hosp., 384 F. Supp.
1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 414 U.S.
473 (1974).
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sary to meet his needs.67 The concept of treatment in the least restric-
tive environment has spread from the case law to recently enacted
mental health codes.68 It became accepted policy that mentally ill peo-
ple would be kept in the hospital for only the time that would be neces-
sary to stabilize them.
The success of these lawsuits in opening the doors of mental insti-
tutions raised questions about what was happening to the person found
not guilty by reason of insanity and those found unfit to stand trial.
69
Public defenders and legal aid attorneys began to question the policies
relating to the mentally ill offender. In Jackson v. Indiana,70 the prac-
tice of automatically committing a person found unfit to stand trial to a
state mental institution was challenged. The United States Supreme
Court, in Jackson, held that the same standard of commitment had to
be used for the person found unfit to stand trial as was used for other
civilly committed individuals.7' In Baxstrom v. Herold,72 the Supreme
Court reviewed the release procedures for persons who had been com-
mitted to hospitals for the criminally insane.
73
Present Reality
Today, in most states, once a defendant has been successful with
his insanity defense plea, the options available to the criminal court
judge are very limited. In a few states, commitment to a mental health
facility for some period of time is automatic. 74 In most states, the court
must hold a hearing or request the prosecutor to petition for a hearing
using the same standard of civil commitment as is used in the mental
health code.75 Since most states require that the person who is subject
to hospitalization be mentally ill and, because of that illness, be likely
to be dangerous to himself or others in the near future, the court is
often faced with a situation where the defendant's symptoms are suffi-
ciently in remission so that he does not qualify for involuntary admis-
sion under the civil commitment standard. This means that the judge
67. Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 863 (1966); Welsch v.
Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972),
vacated, 414 U.S. 473 (1974); Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
68. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , § 3-811 (Supp. 1978); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 1.00
(McKimey 1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.230 (Supp. 1978).
69. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); United States v. Ecker, 543 F.2d 178 (D.C. Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063 (1977).
70. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
71. Id. at 730.
72. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
73. Id. at 111-13.
74. See Appendix B.
75. See id.
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has no choice but to discharge the defendant. Only a few states give
the judge the alternative of discharging the defendant under conditions
the court deems appropriate.76 Even fewer states have developed out-
patient programs to help this sub-population of mentally ill people.
77
The present state of affairs is fraught with problems from both the
courts' and the public's perspective.
PROBLEMS WITH THE PRESENT SYSTEM
In almost every state, the present system relating to the disposition
of the individual found not guilty by reason of insanity is filled with
barriers which make it difficult, if not impossible, for the criminal court
judge to assure that the public's safety is being protected. This system
has four major problems: (1) the NGRI individual must meet the civil
commitment standard; (2) the court is limited to either civil commit-
ment or discharge; (3) in most states there is no option for court im-
posed outpatient treatment; and (4) there are no provisions for review
of the discharge decision in the majority of states.
Problems Surrounding Commitment
Once a defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity, the
criminal court is faced with the issue of how to get the individual com-
mitted into the mental health system. In some states, after a finding of
NGRI, commitment is automatic. 78 In those states, the automatic com-
mitment is usually for a brief period of time so that the mental health
system can assess whether the defendant meets the civil commitment
standard and warrants continued inpatient hospitalization. In the ma-
jority of states, the court must proceed with a hearing to determine
whether the individual meets the civil commitment standard. In many
states, this is accomplished by the prosecutor petitioning for commit-
ment under the civil commitment statute. 79
The standard for civil commitment raises the first barrier to assur-
ing the safety of the public. In most states, the standard for civil com-
mitment is based upon the state's police power to remove dangerous
people from the streets for the community's protection. This power has
led to statutes which require that, before someone can be involuntarily






likely to be dangerous to himself or others in the near future.80 To
meet this burden in the average civil commitment case, the state must
show that the individual is suicidal or homicidal at the present time.
Since most persons who have been found NGRI were excused
from criminal responsibility because they were psychotic at the time,
one would think it would be easy to commit them. However, by the
time of the trial, the NGRI individual's psychosis has ended. He has
probably received some form of psychiatric treatment which caused his
symptoms to disappear sufficiently so that he could be found fit to
stand trial. Even if the NGRI individual is not on medication, the cyc-
lical nature of his illness would have caused his psychosis to disappear.
Thus, from the outset, by using the civil commitment standard, it is
very difficult to get the NGRI individual into involuntary treatment.
In addition to the standard which must be met in most states, the
burden becomes particularly difficult because eleven states require that
the dangerousness be manifested by a recent, overt act.81 This is usu-
ally defined to include threats that occurred within a specific time pe-
riod. If the NGRI individual has been institutionalized, it is unlikely
that he would have "acted out" because of his being situated in a jail.
At the hearing on civil commitment, it is very likely that the rules of
evidence will bar a description of the criminal conduct because it is too
far removed from the commitment hearing. The state thus may have a
very difficult time convincing the court that this individual is in need of
civil commitment. Moreover, in about thirteen states, the situation is
further complicated by requirements that, before an individual can be
civilly committed, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
he meets the civil commitment standard. 82 When the criminal eviden-
80. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , § 1-119 (Supp. 1978) provides: "Person subject to involun-
tary admission . . . means: (1) A person who is mentally ill and who because of his illness is
reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or another in the near fu-
ture .. ..
81. ALA. CODE tit. 22, § 52-1 (Supp. 1979); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West Supp.
1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 1 (West Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253A.02
(West Supp. 1980); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1009 (1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-01-01 (Supp. 1979);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.01 (Page Supp. 1980); 50 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7301 (Purdon
Supp. 1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7101 (Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.020 (Supp.
1979).
82. In re Hodges, 325 A.2d 605 (D.C. Ct. Appeals 1974); Superintendent of Worcester State
Hosp. v. Hagberg, 372 N.E.2d 242 (Mass. 1978); Lausche v. Commissioner of Public Welfare, 302
Minn. 65, 225 N.W.2d 366 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 993 (1975); Proctor v. Butler, 117 N.H.
927, 380 A.2d 673 (1977); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 334-60(4)(I) (Supp. 1979); IDAHO CODE § 66-
329(i) (Supp. 1979): KAN. STAT. § 59-2917 (Supp. 1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 38-1305(7)
(Supp. 1977); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 54.1(C) (Supp. 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 426-130 (1979);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-36(10) (Supp. 1979); WiS. STAT. § 51.20(13)(e) (Supp. 1979-80). See
also Denton v. Kentucky, 383 S.W.2d 681 (Ky. 1964); In re J.W., 44 N.J. Super. 216, 130 A.2d 64,
cert. denied, 24 N.J. 465, 132 A.2d 558 (1957).
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tiary standard of proof is applied to civil commitment cases, it becomes
even more difficult for the state to succeed in getting the NGRI individ-
ual into involuntary treatment.
Recently, in Addington v. Texas,8 3 the United States Supreme
Court recognized the need to balance the deprivation of liberty im-
posed by an involuntary hospitalization for mental illness against the
state's interest in protecting the public from danger. The Court stated:
"We have concluded that the reasonable doubt standard is inappropri-
ate in civil commitment proceedings because, given the uncertainties of
psychiatric diagnosis, it may impose a burden the state cannot meet
and thereby erect an unreasonable barrier to needed medical treat-
ment."'84 Although the Supreme Court decision in Addington recog-
nizes some of the problems the state faces in the area of civil
commitment, for those states which use the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard, it is very difficult to meet this burden of proof in the case of
the NGRI individual.
Finally, when one reviews the problems surrounding the commit-
ment of the NGRI individual, one cannot help but notice the absurd
situation of the prosecutor. At the trial on the criminal charge, the
prosecutor must argue that the defendant knew what he was doing and
was not insane. Once the defendant is found not guilty by reason of
insanity, the prosecutor must reverse his position and argue that the
defendant is now insane enough to require involuntary hospitalization.
When added to the fact that in many states the civil commitment hear-
ing is held before a different judge who is probably not aware of the
criminal charge or the specifics of the crime, one can understand why
the present situation must be changed.
Options When Civil Commitment is Unsuccessful
If the NGRI individual cannot be civilly committed, the court in
most states has no other option but to discharge the individual from
custody.8 5 This means that the individual who has manifested his
mental illness by committing a criminal act is now free to return to the
streets with no one to monitor whether his illness continues in remis-
sion. Since many mentally ill people can have their symptoms con-
83. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
84. Id. at 432.
85. If not automatically committed, the individual could be discharged in Alabama, Arkan-
sas, California, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Illinois, Indiana, Montana, Ne-
braska, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
trolled by the proper medication, it is essential that they receive this
medication. 86 Not only must the medication be taken, but someone
must be monitoring the person to be sure he is on the right dosage and
has his illness under control.87 One of the problems encountered by
treatment professionals is that the chronically mentally ill person often
refuses to take his medication when he feels he is doing well; then he
deteriorates and returns to the hospital again. Once in the hospital, he
is stabilized and the revolving door syndrome begins. 88 Because the
court has no control over these individuals, and because many of them
cannot be relied upon to take their medication or seek treatment as
they deteriorate, the public's safety is placed in jeopardy.
There are a number of states that give the court the option of dis-
charging the individual from custody under such conditions as the
court deems best.89 In most states which permit the option of a court
supervised discharge, it is unclear whether there are any programs
designed for the NGRI individual or whether anyone is actually moni-
toring the person to be sure he is following the court order. Addition-
ally, it is unclear what options are available to the court if the
individual ignores the court order.
Proceedings Upon Discharge from the Hospital
The final area of concern raised by the present system is that, in
many states, once the individual has been committed to the state
mental health facility, he is no longer under the jurisdiction of the
criminal court.90 Once the individual is committed to a mental health
facility, the staff will often know little more than that he was found not
guilty by reason of insanity. The criminal record will not follow the
NGRI individual to the hospital. The treatment staff may not be aware
of the crime the patient was charged with or the specifics of what oc-
curred during the crime. The author is personally aware of cases where
the treatment staff did not believe that the individual could have been a
murderer, and was ready to discharge the patient within one week of
his entering the hospital.9' The staff, unaware of the specifics of the
86. L. HOLLISTER, CLINICAL USE OF PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC DRUGS (1973).
87. Davis, Overview. Maintenance Therapy in Psychiatry.- IZ Affective Disorders, 133 AM. J.
PSYCH. 1-13 (1976).
88. S. GALANN, HANDBOOK OF COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH (1972).
89. See Appendix B.
90. See id.
91. The author was formally an attorney for the Illinois Department of Mental Health. In
that capacity, she was consulted about releasing someone who had been found NGRI of murder
the week before. The therapist stated "I know Mr. - didn't commit any violent act, he is
ready to be discharged." When the therapist was asked if he knew Mr. - had been found not
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past criminal conduct, will treat the NGRI individual the same as the
other patients. By ignoring the violent behavior which led to the crimi-
nal charges, the staff has an incomplete picture of the patient's person-
ality.
With the advent of psychotropic medications, 92 the average length
of stay in the hospital has decreased radically. Once the individual is
stabilized, the staff begins to think of discharging him. With the eco-
nomics of hospitalization, the emphasis is on returning the person to
the community as soon as possible. Therefore, in its haste to save
money, the staff will begin planning for discharge at the moment of
admission.93 This will probably result in the NGRI individual being
returned to the community within a very short period of time after he
has been found not guilty.
Twenty-nine states require that, before discharging a NGRI indi-
vidual, the criminal court review the discharge. 94 By having the court
review the discharge, the public can be assured that someone who is
familiar with the criminal case and is not concerned with the economics
of hospitalization will be reviewing whether discharge is appropriate,
both from the perspective of the patient's treatment needs and the dan-
ger he may present to the community. The criminal court judge is act-
ing to safeguard the interests of the community.
The present system leaves many people in the criminal justice sys-
tem frustrated and concerned that the public is not being properly pro-
tected. This situation arises because the NGRI individual is treated the
same as other civilly committed persons. Some would agree that this is
appropriate because they have been found not guilty. However, this
author believes that these people can be treated differently, based upon
their past behavior, and that the law sanctions such differences in treat-
ment.95
In those states where there are problems with the present proce-
dures when someone is found not guilty by reason of insanity, the au-
thor would like to suggest amending the present law to include some or
all of the elements necessary to remedy these problems. These provi-
sions are found in the "model legislation" presented below.
guilty of murder his rely was "Mr. - said it was a mistake and he didn't commit any violent
act."
92. Brill, The Impact of Modern Chemotherapy on Hospital Organization: Its Scope and Its
Limits, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD WORLD CONGRESS OF PSYCHIATRY (Vol. 3 1964).
93. See note 88 supra.
94. See Appendix B.
95. Due process and equal protection issues are discussed in the text accompanying notes 99-
119 infra.
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MODEL LEGISLATION FOR PROCEEDINGS AFTER BEING FOUND NOT
GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY
Section 1. Deinitions
a. Acquittee-person found not guilty by reason of insanity.
b. "In need of mental health services"-an acquittee who is men-
tally ill and needs either inpatient or outpatient mental health
services.
c. "Mentally ill"-includes any acquittee who has a mental disease
or defect. This would include individuals whose illness is in a
state of remission if there is a reasonable medical probability that
the illness could become active again, and when active would
render the individual dangerous to himself or others.
d. "Person subject to involuntary hospitalization"-an acquittee
who, because of a mental illness, is reasonably expected to be a
danger to himself or others.
e. "Person subject to conditional release"-an acquittee who no
longer is subject to involuntary hospitalization but would benefit
from mental health services.
f. "Mental health services"-includes but is not limited to: outpa-
tient services including drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs;
community adjustment programs; individual, group, or family
therapy; or chemotherapy.
Section 2: Court Ordered Evaluation
Immediately upon a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity,
the court shall order the acquittee to the Department of Mental
Health for a period of thirty days for an evaluation as to his need for
mental health services. The Department shall provide the court
within forty-five days of the acquittee's arrival a report stating
whether the acquittee is in need of mental health services and detail-
ing any services which the Department recommends.
The court may also order the acquittee to be evaluated by an
independent expert upon the acquittee's motion, the motion of the
state, or upon the court's own order. This report shall also determine
whether the defendant is in need of mental health services, and make
recommendations as to the specific services.
Section 3. Hearing as to Needfor Mental Health Services
a. Within sixty days from the finding of not guilty by reason of in-
sanity, the court shall hold a hearing to determine if the acquittee
is in need of mental health services. The court shall consider
whatever reports and testimony it has received from mental
health professionals, as well as the information presented at the
criminal trial which related to the defendant's insanity, as evi-
denced by the crime he was charged with.
b. The findings of the court shall be established by clear and con-
vincing evidence. The burden of proof and the burden of going
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forth with the evidence shall rest with the State. The acquittee
shall be represented by counsel.
c. The court may find:
1. The acquittee is not in need of mental health services, and he
shall be discharged immediately from the custody of the court.
2. The acquittee is subject to involuntary hospitalization, and
he shall be admitted to the custody of the Department of Mental
Health to be treated as provided for in the Mental Health Code
except as provided hereinafter. This treatment shall include peri-
odic review of his need for continued hospitalization.
3. The acquittee is in need of mental health services. The court
then shall determine how the defendant should receive these
services. The court can order a conditional release of the defend-
ant, if inpatient care is not required, under such conditions as
will assure the acquittee's progress in treatment and the safety of
the community. If the acquittee is conditionally released from
the custody of the Department or the court, the court can order
that the facility accepting the acquittee for outpatient treatment
provide periodic reports to the court as to the acquittee's pro-
gress.
Section 4. Conditional Release
a. When the court orders the acquittee released conditionally, upon
conditions stated in the court order, the court shall determine
how long the acquittee shall remain under the jurisdiction of the
court. A conditional release shall not be for a period of more
than five years from the time the conditional release is ordered.
b. If the acquittee violates the conditions of his release, he shall be
immediately hospitalized for an evaluation as to his need for
mental health services. Within twenty days of his being rehos-
pitalized, the court shall hold a hearing to make the same find-
ings it can make under section 3.c. If the court finds that the
acquittee is not in need of any mental health services, or can
satisfactorily receive mental health services on an outpatient ba-
sis, it shall so rule. The court shall have the option of holding
the acquittee in contempt of court for violating its initial court
order.
Section 5. Proceduresfor Person in Custody of Department
of Mental Health
a. Any person in the custody of the Department of Mental Health
pursuant to the provisions of this Act, shall be treated according
to the Mental Health Code except that before he can be given
overnight passes or other off-grounds passes which shall be for
more than ten hours, the court shall be notified, and shall have
an opportunity to object to such off-grounds passes on the basis
that the public's safety will not be protected.
b. Should any person in the custody of the Department of Mental
Health escape from custody, the police and the court shall be
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notified, and all procedures necessary to implement the acquit-
tee's return to custody shall be followed.
Section 6. Proceduresfor Discharge from the Custody of the
Department of Mental Health
a. When the director of the hospital which is providing treatment to
the acquittee determines that he is no longer in need of inpatient
hospitalization, the director shall notify the court with a state-
ment, including acquittee's mental status, and suggestions for
outpatient care or whatever follow-up care the director deems in
the best interest of the acquittee to protect him and to protect the
public.
b. Within thirty days of the notification, the court shall hold a hear-
ing to determine whether the acquittee is ready to be discharged
from the custody of the Department of Mental Health and under
what conditions, if any.
c. At the hearing, the acquittee shall be represented by an attorney.
The State shall have the burden of proving by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that the acquittee is in need of continued hospitali-
zation, if it disagrees with the recommendations of the director of
the hospital.
d. The court can dispense with a hearing if all parties agree to
adopt the recommendations of the director of the hospital and
the acquittee is accepted into an outpatient program that is will-
ing to periodically report to the court on the acquittee's progress.
e. The court shall make findings in accordance with section 3.c. and
if the acquittee is conditionally released it shall be in accordance
with section 4.
Section 7- Petition by Acquitteefor Discharge from Custody or
Custodial Release
a. At any time after sixty days of being placed in the custody of the
Department of Mental Health or on conditional release, the ac-
quittee may petition the court for discharge from custody or a
modification of the terms of conditional release or a discharge
from conditional release. The acquittee shall have the burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence why the release sought
in his petition should be granted. The court may then appoint
independent experts to evaluate the acquittee to determine if his
petition should be granted. Within sixty days from receiving the
petition, the court shall hold a hearing to consider the petition.
The court shall then make its findings.
b. If the relief sought in the petition is denied, the acquittee shall
not be permitted to file another petition for at least six months
from the date of the court hearing.
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Section 8. Remedy of Habeas Corpus
Any order under this Act shall not affect the remedy of habeas
corpus.
Section 9. Applicability to Persons Presently in the System
This act sets forth procedures which apply to all persons found
not guilty by reason of insanity. Before any person previously found
not guilty by reason of insanity can be discharged from the Depart-
ment of Mental Health, the provisions of this article must be com-
plied with.
The above model legislation meets the problems encountered in
the present system. Below is a brief review of how these problems are
solved:
a. Proceedings Continue in the Criminal Court: By continuing juris-
diction in the criminal court, rather than removing the commit-
ment hearing to a civil court, the model legislation provides that
the judge who is most familiar with the acquittee's criminal behav-
ior and most aware of his illness will determine what is in the inter-
est of the public and the acquittee. By keeping the proceedings in
the criminal court and under the criminal code, you have distin-
guished the NGRI individual from other persons in need of mental
health services. As explained in" the next section of this article, this
is legally permissible.
b. Broader Standard for Commitment: The definition of need of in-
voluntary hospitalization is broader than the commitment standard
in most civil statutes because it does not require that the manifesta-
tion of dangerousness be likely to occur in the near future. Addi-
tionally, the state does not have to be concerned with proving a
recent overt act or meeting the beyond a reasonable doubt standard
of proof.
c. Provisions for Outpatient Care Under Supervision: The condi-
tional release provisions and the definition of in need of mental
health services make it possible for the criminal court judge to as-
sure that the acquittee is receiving the care he needs to keep his
illness in remission and to protect the public. The provisions re-
quiring periodic reports to the court and enforcement of the acquit-
tee's conditional release terms assure a higher standard of
compliance. This puts teeth into the conditional release provisions
since there are known repercussions to the acquittee who does not
follow those provisions.
d. Review of Discharge Decision: Under the model statute, the pro-
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tection of the public is assured by provision for review of the rec-
ommendations for discharge of the director of the mental health
hospital. Not only is the time of discharge reviewed, but the court
can require outpatient provisions which will help assure the acquit-
tee's satisfactory progress once outside of the hospital setting.
e. Permit Mental Health Department to Treat with Broad Discretion:
Although there was no discussion in the previous section about the
need for mental health professionals to be able to treat the patient
without the court looking over their every move, the model legisla-
tion makes it clear that the department of mental health has discre-
tion to treat the acquittee as it deems appropriate with the
exception of giving the acquittee overnight off-grounds passes and
discharging without the court's approval. With these two excep-
tions, the department of mental health is free to treat the patient in
the way it deems best. This is an implicit recognition that the pro-
fessionals in the mental health area should be free to perform their
jobs without interference from the court, except when the public's
safety must be protected.
A WORKING MODEL
A review of the statutes reveals that both Oregon 96 and Mary-
land97 have workable laws that meet the goals of remedying the
problems with the present system. The author had the opportunity to
review the Maryland system and believes it provides an excellent ex-
ample of how a state can meet the needs of the defendant while at the
same time protecting the public's interest. Below is an operational
overview of the Maryland system.
After a hearing has been held to determine that the defendant is in
need of inpatient hospitalization, the defendant is sent to the Clifton T.
Perkins Hospital in Baltimore, Maryland where he gradually is given
more and more freedom, as it becomes apparent to the staff that he can
handle this freedom. The hospital has vocational, educational, and rec-
reational programs for its patients. Once the patient appears to be do-
ing well, he is given a job within the hospital which requires that he
work regular hours. If the patient handles these responsibilities well,
the process of trying to find employment for the patient outside the
hospital begins.
Perkins Hospital is located one-half hour from downtown Balti-
96. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.319-161.351 (1979).
97. MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 28 (1979).
INSANITY DEFENSE
more, making it possible to find employment opportunities. For a pe-
riod of about three months, the patient will leave the hospital in the
morning to work and return in the evening. Once the staff determines
that the patient is able to handle these responsibilities, it begins plan-
ning for the discharge of the patient.
As the discharge process begins, the staff involves the patient's
family and begins looking for a suitable living situation for the patient.
The staff knows success in the community is likely to depend upon be-
ing employed and living in a stable situation. Perkins Hospital also
runs its own halfway house, located in Baltimore. This assures that the
patient has somewhere to go where he will receive supervision and sup-
port. Once the staff is ready to discharge the patient, it petitions the
court for a conditional discharge.
The court then specifies the conditions of discharge. Under Mary-
land law, the conditional discharge can remain in effect for up to five
years. At any point during the hospitalization or during the condi-
tional discharge, the patient can petition the court for discharge or
modification of the conditions.
Usually, the person continues under the supervision of the staff of
Perkins Hospital after receiving a conditional discharge. He may be
living in the halfway house. Even if he is not residing at the halfway
house, the patient is still meeting on a regular basis with a therapist
from Perkins. As the patient needs less supervision, he may meet with
the therapist less frequently. It is possible that in the beginning the
patient will be meeting with his therapist a few times a week, and by
the end of five years may only be meeting with the therapist every
month or every few months.
This system has the advantage of exposing the patient to more re-
sponsibilities and more freedom on a gradual basis. While the patient
is being exposed to these responsibilities, a qualified staff is monitoring,
evaluating, and supporting the patient. Before the patient is exposed to
more freedom, the staff has determined what his needs are and has
tried to meet them through educational or vocational programs. Only
when a conditional discharge is requested does the court review the
suggestions of the Maryland Department of Mental Health. Until that
time, the department is free to proceed in the manner it feels is most
appropriate.
The Maryland program appears to be working very successfully. 98
98. Clifton T. Perkins Outcome Study: A Review of 65 Patients Presently on Convalescent
Leave (D. Madden, Consultant) (unpublished study on file with author).
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The program contains most of the elements in the proposed model leg-
islation and shows that it is possible to meet the needs of the patient
while protecting the interests of the public.
LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR TREATING NGRI INDIVIDUALS
DIFFERENTLY THAN OTHER CIVILLY COMMITTED PERSONS
This article has been based upon the premise that once an individ-
ual has been found NGRI, the state may treat him differently than
other persons who are facing civil commitment proceedings. The
model legislation suggested herein treats the NGRI individual differ-
ently at the time of commitment by using a broader standard of com-
mitment. It also treats him differently in terms of off-grounds passes,
review of the decision to discharge, and by permitting the court to im-
pose court supervised outpatient care for up to five years after inpatient
discharge.
The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
vides in part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. . . ,,99 There are
those who will argue that, once an individual has been found not guilty
by reason of insanity, he is no longer under the jurisdiction of the crim-
inal courts and must be treated the same as other individuals where
civil commitment is the goal. This author believes that the law which
permits treating the NGRI individual differently from other civilly
committed persons is well-established. The arguments against differen-
tials in treatment follow two predictable paths: denial of due process
and denial of equal protection.
Due Process
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is recognized
as the provision which assures that an individual is afforded certain
rights at the time the state is trying to deprive him of his liberty or
property. The amount of process which is due depends upon the cir-
cumstances. When the state tries to deprive an individual of his prop-
erty, he is entitled to fewer protective procedures than if he were being
deprived of his liberty. A civil commitment for mental illness is a dep-
rivation of liberty which entitles the patient to certain rights. 00 These
99. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
100. Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378
(M.D. Ala. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded
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rights include notice of the proceedings, 10 the right to cross examina-
tion, 0 2 and the right to be represented by an attorney. 03 In the pro-
posed model legislation, the NGRI is given the same rights as the
person who is being civilly committed. In addition, to assure the rights
of this person, periodic review of his status and permission to petition
for his discharge or modification of his conditions of release are pro-
vided. Thus, a due process argument would be unsuccessful.
Equal Protection
The equal protection argument presents the need for a more
thoughtful legal analysis. It can be anticipated that the attorney for the
NGRI individual will argue that his client is not being treated equally
to other civilly committed patients in four ways: (1) he is committed
under a broader standard; (2) he is treated differently when it comes to
off-grounds passes; (3) the discharge of the NGRI individual is subject
to court review, while that of other civilly committed persons is not;
and (4) the NGRI individual can have a particular mode of outpatient
care imposed upon him for up to five years, while the civilly committed
individual cannot be required to participate in any outpatient program.
The attorney would then go on to cite two United States Supreme
Court decisions to prove that his client must be treated equally and is
being denied equal protection. The first case the attorney would cite
would be Baxstrom v. Herold. '04 In Baxstrom, the Court struck down a
New York statutory scheme which permitted convicted persons to be
civilly committed at the end of their prison terms without being granted
the same rights as others where civil commitment was sought. The
Court stated: "We hold that petitioner was denied equal protection of
the laws by the statutory procedure under which a person may be
civilly committed at the expiration of his penal sentence without the
jury review available to all other persons civilly committed in New
York." 05
Baxstrom has been cited in numerous cases challenging provisions
relating to persons found NGRI .106 However, Baxstrom is different
on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974); Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa.
1971).
101. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1091 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
102. 349 F. Supp. at 1097-1100.
103. Id. at 1097-98; Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1050-51 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
104. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
105. Id. at 110.
106. E.g., Powell v. Florida, 579 F.2d 324, 330-32 (5th Cir. 1978); Hill v. State, 358 So. 2d 190,
200 (Fla. App. 1978); Chase v. Kearns, 278 A.2d 132, 138 (Me. 1971).
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from the situation the author anticipates because all NGRI individuals
will be treated the same, whereas in Baxstrom the statute only applied
to persons who were completing their prison terms and did not apply to
convicted felons who had finished their sentences or were out on bail.
The Baxstrom Court also relied upon the fact that these individuals
were denied a jury and were committed in a procedure which clearly
denied them their due process rights. In the model legislation, the
NGRI individual is given the same procedural protection as the civilly
committed person.
The second case the attorney for the NGRI individual would cite
would be Jackson v. Indiana. 10 7 In Jackson, a retarded deaf mute was
found unfit to stand trial and because of his unfitness was committed to
the Indiana Department of Mental Health "until such time as that De-
partment should certify to the court that 'the defendant is sane.' "108
Because of his retardation and his inability to communicate, it was
clear that Jackson would never become fit to stand trial. Yet, under the
Indiana statute, Jackson was effectively committed for life. The Court
concluded:
[W]e hold that by subjecting Jackson to a more lenient commitment
standard and to a more stringent standard of release than those gen-
erally applicable to all others not charged with offenses, and by thus
condemning him in effect to permanent institutionalization without
the showing required for commitment or the opportunity for release
afforded by § 22-1209 or § 22-1907, Indiana deprived petitioner of
equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. 0 9
Jackson is different from the NGRI individual in a number of respects.
First, Jackson had never been through the criminal justice system; there
had been no determination of whether he had committed a crime. Sec-
ond, there was no requirement that the state show that Jackson was
dangerous before being committed. Dangerousness is recognized as the
criterion for utilizing the state's police power to civilly commit."l 0
Third, there were no provisions for periodic review of Jackson or for
possible discharge until he recovered from his insanity. In the pro-
posed legislation, the NGRI individual cannot be committed unless he
is dangerous, and he has the right to review of his commitment and can
petition for his discharge. Additionally, the NGRI individual is not in
107. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
108. Id. at 719.
109. Id. at 730.
110. E.g., Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Haw. 1976); Bell v. Wayne County
Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Logan v. Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Conn.
1972), ag-d, 411 U.S. 911 (1973); see generally Ross, Commitment of the Mentally I: Problems of
Law and Policy, 57 MICH. L. REV. 945, 954-60 (1959); Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill:
Theories and Procedure, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1288, 1289-95 (1966).
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legal limbo like Jackson. The NGRI individual has already completed
his path through the criminal justice system.
The issue which would be raised in a challenge to a statute like the
model one is: "Is the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution violated by treating the person
found not guilty by reason of insanity differently from other civilly
committed persons?" The author would obviously answer in the nega-
tive. The past criminal behavior of the NGRI individual demonstrates
his dangerousness to society and thus justifies treating him differently
than the civil committee who has not engaged in such behavior.
The equal protection clause does not require treating all persons
alike. However, this clause will become the starting point in any law-
suit challenging differentials in treatment between two groups that ap-
pear similarly situated. The United States Supreme Court has
explained the requirements of equal protection:
The distinctions drawn by a challenged statute must bear some ra-
tional relationship to a legitimate state end and will be set aside as
violative of the Equal Protection Clause only if based on reasons to-
tally unrelated to the pursuit of that goal. Legislatures are presumed
to have acted constitutionally even if source materials normally re-
sorted to for ascertaining their grounds for action are otherwise si-
lent, and their statutory classifications will be set aside only if no
grounds can be conceived to justify them."I '
The most notable case which analyzed treating the NGRI individ-
ual differently for purposes of discharge was United States v. Ecker."1
2
In Ecker, an issue raised was whether a provision of the laws of the
District of Columbia, which required court review of a proposal for
conditional release or discharge, violated the equal protection rights of
the patient because he was treated differently than other civilly com-
mitted persons who could be discharged on the authority of the chief of
the hospital. Ecker also challenged the fact that the court had to find
that the NGRI individual was not likely to endanger himself or others
in the reasonably foreseeable future, while the civil committee only had
to convince the chief of the.hospital that he was not likely to injure
himself or other persons.
The Ecker court determined that the dangerousness demonstrated
by the commission of a crime and acquittal by reason of insanity was a
rational basis for the disparity in release provisions." 13 In further elab-
oration, the court held:
111. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1968).
112. 543 F.2d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063 (1977).
113. 543 F.2d at 195.
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"Equal protection does not require that all persons be dealt with
identically, but it does require that a distinction made have some rel-
evance to the purpose for which the classification is made," Le., "a
reasonable justification." Subsection (d) patients are treated differ-
ently from other civil commitees [sic] because they are an "excep-
tional class of people" who have "already unhappily manifested the
reality of anti-social conduct." '" 4
The court then noted that it did not understand how independent
judicial review of a discharge decision deprives the patient of any sub-
stantial right. Moreover, according to the Ecker court, that review is
designed for the protection of the public against whom the acquittee
already has been shown to have committed one or more criminal acts,
thus differentiating himself from the civilly committed individual." 15
Ecker makes it clear, through its well-reasoned opinion, that a review
of the discharge decision and ordering of a conditional release is appro-
priate for the NGRI individual, even though this procedure is not ap-
plied to other civilly committed individuals.
The issue which was not addressed in Ecker is whether a broader
standard of commitment can be used when involuntarily hospitalizing
an NGRI individual. The model legislation proposed in this article
requires that, to involuntarily hospitalize a person found NGRI, the
state would have to show that he was reasonably expected to be a dan-
ger to himself or others. This is broader than the standard in many
states which requires that the person be expected to harm himself or
another in the near future. The proposed standard, however, has the
two elements essential to justify civil commitment: (1) an identifiable
mental illness and (2) a showing that, as a result of that illness, the
NGRI individual is likely to injure himself or others. It is well-recog-
nized that the police power permits the state to civilly commit those
who present a danger." 6 This author believes that a psychiatric evalu-
ation which reveals that the NGRI individual might present a danger
to himself or others, based in part upon his past behavior, is a standard
sufficient to withstand constitutional attack on equal protection
grounds.
Recently, the Supreme Court of Alaska was faced with a question
of whether the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant who was found not guilty by reason of insanity was suffering
from a mental disease which rendered him a danger to society.' 17 The
114. Id. at 197 (citations omitted).
115. Id. at 198.
116. See note 110 and accompanying text supra.
117. Alaska v. Alto, 589 P.2d 402 (Alaska 1979).
INSANITY DEFENSE
court felt that equal protection did not require the state to use the same
standard as that used for civil commitment when there was a rational
basis for doing otherwise. The court stated:
The acquittee by reason of insanity has, by his affirmative defense,
admitted that he was insane at the time of the act in question and he
has presented evidentiary support for his admission. Such an admis-
sion distinguishes the acquittee by reason of insanity from one whose
involuntary commitment is civilly sought and has consistently main-
tained that he is not mentally ill. Moreover, the acquittee by reason
of insanity has committed a criminal act. He therefore differs from
the civil committee who is confined because of his potential to com-
mit dangerous acts, not because he has committed them." 1
8
Equal protection only requires that differences in treatment be-
tween two groups have relevance to the purpose for which the classifi-
cation was made.' ' 9 It is clear that the legislature can justify, based
upon admitted past criminal behavior, different treatment for the
NGRI individual when entering and being discharged from the mental
health system.
CONCLUSION
The present state of the law relating to the insanity defense re-
quires that most states adopt procedures to follow when someone has
been found not guilty by reason of insanity. The procedures discussed
in this article are aimed at providing treatment to the NGRI individual
and assuring the public's safety. The procedures which are necessary
would provide for a broader standard of commitment, review of a rec-
ommendation for discharge from the state department of mental
health, and provisions for the court to order outpatient care under court
supervision.
The differentials in treatment for the NGRI individuals can be jus-
tified based upon the past admitted criminal behavior of the acquittee.
This behavior provides the legislature with the rationale for adopting
different laws relating to the NGRI individual as compared with other
civilly committed mental patients. This rationale will be sufficient to
withstand challenges based upon denial of due process or equal protec-
tion.
118. Id. at 406.





















































































































STATE PROCEDURES AFTER FINDING OF NOT GUILTY BY
REASON OF INSANITY
AUTOMATIC IS OUTPATIENT COURT APPROVAl
COMMITMENT CARE POSSIBLE FOR RELEASE
If court deems necessary No No
No - court must find dangerous to public No Yes








Yes - 30 days No Yes
No Yes No
Yes Yes Yes
Hold hearing under MHC Yes Yes
Hold hearing under MHC No No











Civil hearing held Yes Yes
Civil commitment hearing No No
Yes No No
No No No
Yes - civil hearing held Yes Yes
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